Pulling the Alarm on the Muslim Brotherhood - Part II of III.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s Stated Plan for the West - Looking Ahead Fifty Years
Why Arithmetic, Not Apocalypse, Explains How Civilisations Are Replaced Without a Shot Fired
It’s a lot easier than you think. Though anyone reading this will be dead before 2075, please continue, God knows I’ll be dead by then, and it pains me to say I won’t be able to gloat and say I told you so.
No serious analyst claims to know the future.
History punishes certainty. What can be done, however, is trend analysis—the same method used to forecast pension solvency, climate impacts, urban planning, and public health.
This paper asks a narrow question:
If current demographic trends, migration patterns, institutional incentives, and declared ideological strategies continue without abrupt disruption, what outcomes become more likely by the end of the century?
This is not a claim of inevitability. It is a conditional exercise: if A continues, B becomes plausible. etc.
No violence is assumed. No illegality is required. No secret coordination is alleged. The framework used is explicitly non-violent, open, and documented.
The ideological material referenced—particularly the Muslim Brotherhood’s 1991 Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America and the writings of Hassan al-Banna—describes a gradual, lawful, institutional transformation of society from within. The language is explicit about patience, legality, and adaptation to local conditions.
The analysis below does not add intent or exaggeration. It simply aligns demography with declared strategy.
Methodology: Arithmetic and Institutions
The analysis rests on four inputs:
Demographics
Differential fertility rates
Net migration flows
Age structure and generational replacement
Urban concentration
Political Systems
Proportional representation
Coalition governments
Judicialized rights regimes
Administrative law elasticity
Cultural Incentives
Anti-discrimination norms
Reputational sanctions
Institutional risk aversion
Asymmetry of moral confidence
Declared Strategy
Non-violent, long-term, institutional change
Emphasis on education, law, culture, and legitimacy
Rejection of abrupt confrontation in minority contexts
No acceleration is assumed. No collapse is assumed. This is linear continuation, not catastrophe modelling.
Demographic Baseline
Using Pew Research, UN population projections, and national statistics:
Muslim populations in much of Western Europe grow faster than host populations due to:
Younger median age
Higher fertility (even as rates decline)
Continued migration from higher-fertility regions
Political influence does not require majority status.
15–25% cohesive populations in proportional systems often exert decisive leverage.
Urban concentration amplifies influence.
The Brotherhood’s Framework
The ultimate objective, stated plainly in their writings, is Islamic governance—a caliphate governed by Islamic law, with sharia as the supreme legal authority. In Western societies, this objective is pursued not through force but through settlement (tamkeen), influence, and legitimacy.
The geographic scope is explicitly global. The documents do not differentiate Cairo from Paris, Toronto, London, or New York in principle—only in method.
At this point, two empirical observations matter.
First, survey research across Western countries consistently finds that a significant minority of Muslims—often ranging between roughly 18 and 40 percent, depending on country and question wording—express support for sharia as a governing legal framework or for religious law taking precedence over secular law. These respondents are overwhelmingly non-violent; violence is not the mechanism under discussion.
Second, social science research on political and cultural change shows that majority support is not required to alter norms, institutions, or policy direction.
Across multiple domains, studies of minority influence, agenda-setting, and norm cascades indicate that cohesive and motivated groups representing as little as 15–25 percent of a population can exert disproportionate influence, particularly when the broader majority is passive, fragmented, or reluctant to articulate its own values.
Political systems with proportional representation, coalition governments, and judicialized rights regimes further amplify this effect.
Taken together, these findings explain why the Brotherhood’s strategy does not depend on numerical dominance. It depends on organisation, persistence, institutional engagement, and the absence of confident resistance—not on majority conversion.
