Human Rights laws were conceived as restraints on power, not as instruments for its discretionary use. They emerged from catastrophe—war, genocide, ethnic cleansing—and were grounded in a sober recognition that authority, when left unchecked, will abuse itself. Their moral legitimacy rested on objectivity: evidence, notice, proportionality, and the presumption of innocence. Remove those foundations, and “human rights” ceases to be law. It becomes ritualised coercion.
Across much of North America, that transformation is no longer theoretical. It is already well advanced.
What now operates under the banner of human-rights enforcement—particularly within universities, colleges, corporations, and administrative tribunals—often bears only a cosmetic resemblance to justice. These regimes do not function as legal systems in any meaningful sense. They do not reliably follow statute, adhere to their own codes, or respect the basic architecture of natural justice Instead, they operate through an …
